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JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from Carla Lyman's personal injury suit against Marc Solomon 
as the personal representative of the estate of Ruthellen Pollan, deceased. The district 
court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and certifying 
it as final. (Case No. 070700106, R. at 396—97.) Carla Lyman timely appealed. (R. at 
387—88.) This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103 (2009). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court deviated from long-settled 
Utah Supreme Court authority when it granted Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of negligence. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
Defendant Marc Solomon moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
negligence. (R. at 243—61.) Plaintiff Carla Lyman opposed Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of negligence, thereby preserving the issue presently 
before this Court. (R. at 287—98.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
"reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
v 
UT 2, Tf 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In turn, the 
appellate court does not accord any deference to the trial court regarding its "resolution of 
the legal issues presented . . . and determine^] only whether the trial court erred in 
applying the governing law." Ervin v. Lowe's Cos,, 2005 UT App 463, Tj 8, 128 P.3d 11 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton, 
2007 UT App 109, \ 7, 158 P.3d 1121 ("In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment 
. . . we give no deference to the trial court's decision.") cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 
2007). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The question presented on appeal does not raise any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal. 
STATEMENT O F THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Carla Lyman brought suit against the estate of Ruthellen Pollan for injuries that 
Ms. Lyman incurred on Ruthellen Pollan's property while Ms. Lyman was serving in her 
role as a personal caretaker of Ruthellen Pollan, now deceased. (R. at 003-007.) Ms. 
Lyman sued the estate under the theory of negligence based in premises liability. (R. at 
005.) Within the complaint, Ms. Lyman alleged that Defendant owed a duty of care to 
Ms. Lyman and that Ms. Lyman held the status of a business invitee. (R. at 005-006.) 
vi 
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the negligence theory. (R. at 243— 
61.) Plaintiff Lyman opposed Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 278— 
98.) The district court granted Defendant's motion. (R. at 396—97.) 
This appeal follows. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Carla Lyman sued Defendant on September 4, 2007. (Case No. 070700106, R. at 
003—007.) 
Defendant moved for summary judgment against Carla Lyman. (R. at 243—61.) 
Carla Lyman opposed the motion and it was fully briefed. (R. at 287—98.) The district 
court heard oral argument on November 30, 2009, and granted Defendant's summary 
judgment motion. (R. at 396—97.) The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed with the Seventh Judicial District Court on December 23, 
2009. (R. at 390—91.) The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was signed by Judge Anderson and entered by the Trial Court on January 4, 
2010. 
Carla Lyman timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Trial Court on December 
21,2009. (R. at 387—88.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 21, 2004, Carla Lyman (hereinafter "Carla" or "Plaintiff) was working 
as a health care aid for Ruthellen Pollan (hereinafter "Defendant") at Defendant's 
residence. (Deposition of Carla Lyman, R. at 264, 42:4-5, 18-19.) Carla had been 
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working for Defendant since July of 2003. {Id. at 30:5*7.) Upon arrival on the evening 
of May 21, 2004, Carla stepped into an indentation in Defendant's uneven driveway 
causing her to fall. {Id. at 47:24-48:22.) Carla described the fall in her deposition as 
follows: 
Carla: 
Attorney: 
Carla: 
Attorney: 
Carla: 
Attorney: 
Carla: 
Attorney: 
Carla: 
{Id at 51:7-22.) 
I felt my left foot sliding and it turned. I thought I had ~ and 
then I rolled a couple of times and I thought I had hurt my 
right knee. And whenever I grabbed it and raised up, and my 
foot was on completely backwards. 
Did your foot slip on the gravel? 
No. I think it was the - it was stuck when the other one was 
sliding. 
Well, which foot slipped? 
My left foot was just turning, sliding on the gravel. 
And that's what caused you to fall? 
No. 
Well, what caused you to fall? 
I think the hole did, the indention in the roadway. 
Although it was too dark for Carla to see the hole in the driveway, she describes it 
as "enough that it caught my left - my right foot and I felt my left foot turning." {Id. at 
50:4-5.) Carla clearly recalls that the hole was large enough to catch her right foot, 
indicating that she did not merely step into a minor indention in the driveway, but was 
actually caught by a hole. Because her right foot was caught in the hole while her left 
foot slid, her right foot actually twisted so the foot appeared to be on backwards. {Id. at 
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62:3-7.) As a result of the fall Carla suffered severe injuries to both of her legs and 
incurred significant medical expenses. (Id. at 62:3-63:17.) 
Carla testified that the driveway was landscaped by Defendant and that the surface 
was uneven "because of the way the road was built." (Id. at 57:11-17.) Defendant had 
her driveway landscaped with cobblestones. (Id. at 48:5-18.) The cobblestones were 
round, like river rocks, and were of all different shapes and sizes. (Id. at 55:9-56:14.) 
Movement and shifts of these stones presumably caused further indentations, unevenness, 
holes, and general unpredictability in the surface of the driveway. (Id. at 55:9-16.) 
Carla's employment at Defendant's residence involved working several night 
shifts. (Id. at 35:25-36:4.) The exact time Carla arrived at Defendant's residence for 
work on the evening of May 21, 2004, is unknown, but Carla speculated it to be "around 
9:00, 10:00." (Id. at 46:2.) The Defendant had a lamp in her yard at the end of the front 
sidewalk, by the driveway. (Id. at 43:24-25.) The lamp was usually lit at night and Carla 
remembered the lamp being on the night before she suffered her injuries. (Id. at 44:3-5.) 
However, the lamp was unlit on the night of May 21, 2004, the night of the accident. (Id. 
at 43:9-18.) Without the light on, Carla testified that at the time of the accident it was 
"very dark" and "there was no lights out there." (Id. at 43:9-18.) Carla noted that it was 
so dark that her coworker "had a hard time finding [her]" as Carla called for help. (Id. at 
43:11, 60:22-61:7.) The coworker, Alisa Alder, in her sworn affidavit confirmed that it 
was "very dark" that night, the "driveway was not lit", and she "had a hard time locating 
[Carla]" because of the darkness. (Affidavit of Alisa Alder, R. at 221—22.) 
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Although Defendant was personally unable to perform maintenance on the 
premises, she employed a maintenance person to make repairs at and around the premises 
named, Jerry Perez. (Deposition of Carla Lyman, R. at 264, 42: 21-24.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As indicated by a large body of Utah case law, addressed herein, negligence is 
only properly addressed on summary judgment in exceptional circumstances. The facts 
presented by this case are not ripe for a summary judgment disposition, so the trial 
court's judgment should be reversed. 
Utah case law makes clear that landowners such as Defendant owe an elevated 
duty of care to business invitees. Because Carla Lyman came to Defendant's premises as 
an employee of Defendant, to provide services to Defendant at Defendant's residence, 
Carla was a business invitee. Significant questions of fact remain as to whether 
Defendant met this heightened duty with regards to providing a safe passageway for 
Carla to the residence. 
Furthermore, because Defendant made attempts to improve the safety of the 
driveway through the addition of a lamp and landscaping the driveway, Defendant 
undertook a higher duty, which she was under a duty to discharge non-negligently. 
Again, questions of fact remain as to whether Defendant's adjustments to the safety of 
the passageway were negligent. Carla is entitled to have such questions of fact answered 
by a jury. 
x 
ARGUMENT 
The district court inappropriately granted Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment for three primary reasons. First, per longstanding Utah precedent, a question of 
negligence is almost always a question to be resolved by a jury; this case presents a 
question of negligence not within the ambit of the exception to the general rule. 
Secondly, questions of fact remain that preclude the granting of summary judgment. 
Third, it is hornbook law that property owners owe an elevated duty of care to their 
business invitees; that elevated duty applied, and was breached, in this case. And fourth, 
when one endeavors to observe a higher degree of safety on one's property, such an 
endeavor must be undertaken non-negligently; Defendant attempted to observe a higher 
degree of care, but was negligent in her maintenance of her driveway and her yard lamp. 
I. The Question of Negligence Presented by the Underlying Facts Should not 
Have Been Decided on Summary Judgment 
Because the underlying action was based on a claim of negligence, it should not 
have been disposed of on summary judgment. The facts pled raise questions as to the 
duty of care that must be exercised by a landowner in relation to the landowner's 
business invitees—such questions of fact must be addressed by a jury. 
A. Summary Judgment Was Improper as this is a Negligence Case 
The propriety of summary judgment on a negligence claim has been addressed ad 
nauseam by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of White v. 
1 
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) addressed the rare applicability of 
summary judgment in negligence cases, as follows: 
[S]ummary judgment is generally inappropriate to resolve negligence 
claims and should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); see also 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991); Hunt v. 
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990); Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723, 725 (Utah 1985); Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). "Ordinarily, whether 
a Defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact 
for the jury." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); see also 
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183. "Accordingly, summary judgment is 
inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is 'fixed by law,' and 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the Defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 (citations 
omitted); see also Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 
1977). 
Id. at 1374. 
In this case the trial court's grant of summary judgment was in error. This was not 
a "clear-cut case" of nonnegligence. Further, the standard of care in this case is not fixed 
by law in a statute. In turn, the question of negligence should have been left to the jury. 
B. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Which Precludes the Granting of 
Summary Judgment in Defendant's Favor 
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant failed to 
discharge her duty as it relates to Carla Lyman. A genuine issue of material fact exists 
"where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ." West One 
Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The Utah Supreme 
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Court has indicated what must happen before a question of negligence may be 
determined as a matter of law: 
Before the question of negligence becomes one of law, for the court, the 
facts shown by the evidence must be such that all reasonable men must 
draw the same conclusions from them. If the facts proven are such that 
reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether or not there was negligence, 
the question is one for the jury to consider. 
Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (Utah 1967) (internal citation omitted). 
In granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court disregarded 
a body of facts and case law that supports Carla Lyman's position. As held by extensive 
Utah Supreme Court precedent, the question of negligence should not have been resolved 
as a matter of law by the trial court. 
C. Plaintiff was Present on Defendant's Premises as a Business Invitee, 
Requiring Defendant to Observe an Elevated Duty of Care, Which 
Defendant Breached 
Defendant owed an elevated duty of care to Carla Lyman as a business invitee to 
Defendant's home. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established when a possessor of 
land is subject to liability for injuries of invitees, in accord with Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §343: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize 
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) 
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger. 
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Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, If 8, 116 P.3d 263, citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §343. 
Carla Lyman was on Defendant's property for the benefit of Defendant. She was 
Defendant's invitee. Carla Lyman's status as a business invitee avails her of the benefit 
of a higher standard of care while on Defendant's property. The drafters of the 
Restatement section addressed above provide the following insight relating to invitees on 
a landowner's property: 
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the duty to 
exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous conditions which are 
known to the possessor, and are likely not to be discovered by the licensee. 
To the invitee the possessor owes not only this duty, but also the additional 
duty to exercise reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe 
for the reception of the visitor, or a least to ascertain the condition of the 
land, and to give such warning that the visitor may decide intelligently 
whether or not to accept the invitation, or may protect himself against the 
danger if he does accept it. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b. 
Defendant breached the duty owed to Carla Lyman by failing to assure the yard 
light was functional to allow Carla safe passage to the home and by failing to maintain 
the condition of the landscaped driveway. Further, the driveway as-landscaped presented 
a permanent unsafe condition, due to the nature of the rocks that compose the driveway— 
river rocks are rounded rocks, and as such, they present a constant danger for individuals 
who are forced to walk over the same in order to reach Defendant's front door. See 
Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding grocer liable 
under permanent unsafe condition for slip and fall victim's injuries arising from slip on 
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lettuce leaves; leaves were present on floor due to method of display that lead to 
possibility of lettuce leaves being strewn on floor where customers would walk) (cited 
with approval, but not applied, in Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, \ 26, 196 P.3d 576). 
In the event the danger to Carla is deemed open and obvious, such a finding does 
not completely bar her recovery, as Utah is a comparative fault state. See Hale v. 
Beckstead, 2005 UT 24 at If 39. Even if a danger is open and obvious, if a landowner 
should expect that an invitee will fail to protect herself against a dangerous condition, 
Defendant must exercise reasonable care to protect her. See id. at 125. 
Defendant owed Carla Lyman an elevated duty of care to maintain the safety of 
her property, to reasonably assure the property was safe for Carla, and to warn Carla of 
any dangers. Defendant failed to ensure that the light was functioning, that the driveway 
stones were in place, and also failed to warn Carla of any dangers. In turn, Defendant 
breached her duty to Carla. 
The district court improperly prevented the question of breach of care from 
reaching the jury in this case. As discussed in Section I above, a question of negligence 
in regard to an ordinary standard of care is, almost without fail, not appropriately dealt 
with on summary judgment. In light of the elevated duty of care presently applicable, 
summary judgment is even more suspect. The question of negligence in this case should 
have been submitted to the jury; failing to do so is reversible error. 
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D. Defendant Assumed an Elevated Duty of Care, Which She Failed to 
Observe in a Nonnegligent Fashion 
Defendant undertook an elevated level of care when she installed a yard lamp to 
illuminate the walkway to her home and installed river rocks to form the base of her 
driveway. Defendant failed to maintain the elevated level of care in a nonnegligent 
fashion and thereby caused Carla Lyman's injuries. Utah courts have consistently upheld 
the common law view that individuals are only under a duty to act reasonably in regard to 
others' safety unless there is a higher statutorily-imposed duty or unless the individual 
undertakes a higher duty; in the event the individual undertakes a higher duty, the duty 
must be undertaken nonnegligently. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, LLC, 
2008 UT 21, \ 16, 182 P.3d 333 (holding that once a therapist acted, in spite of lack of 
duty, she had an obligation to do so nonnegligently); Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 542 P.2d 1090, 1090-91 (Utah 1975) (holding that by undertaking to keep sidewalk 
level, bank owed duty to plaintiff to keep sidewalk level, and that whether bank breached 
duty was question for jury). 
In this case, Defendant undertook a duty to maintain her landscaped driveway, and 
sidewalk lighting, to avoid exposing Carla Lyman and others to danger. 
Defendant undertook the duty to keep the mode of entry to her home lit by 
maintaining her yard lamp with a functioning light bulb. Additionally, Defendant 
undertook the duty to make the driveway more passable than the customary gravel- and 
sand-based driveway by using river rocks; in undertaking these elevated duties, 
Defendant was required to do so in a nonnegligent manner. By failing to keep the light at 
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the end of her sidewalk operational and lit on the night at issue and failing to assure that 
the river rocks that formed the base for the driveway did not leave dangerous holes in the 
driveway, Defendant breached the higher duty she owed to Carla Lyman, causing severe 
and permanent injuries. 
Holding Defendant liable for failing to adequately maintain the yard lamp and the 
river rock driveway does not expand landowners' duties to their invitees to require 
landowners to light their yards and landscape their drives. It does not expand 
landowners' potential liability. Rather, it simply echoes the longstanding view that 
landowners who undertake a duty must do so nonnegligently. 
In turn, the trial court's decision was in error and Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment should not have been granted on the issue of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in the sections above, the trial court erred in entering summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant as Utah case law paired with the present facts clearly 
militate against the rendering of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
DATED this V* day of July, 2010. 
M 
KENNETH D. LOUGEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Seventh Judicial District 
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Kevin S. Gardner #6230 
STUCKI, STEELE, PIA, ANDERSON & RENCHER 
299 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 961-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA LYMAN, : 
Plaintiff, ' 
v. ' 
MARC SOLOMON, as personal ; 
representative of the ESTATE OF ; 
RUTHELLEN POLLAN, deceased, ; 
)
 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
]
 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
[ JUDGMENT 
[ Civil No. 070700106 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant. 
THIS COURT, having received and duly considered Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with supporting and reply memoranda, as well as Plaintiffs memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and having set this matter for oral argument on November 30, 2009 at 
1:00 p.m., Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for hearing duly 
noticed. Defendant appeared by counsel Kevin S. Gardner. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel 
appeared at the hearing. After hearing oral argument from Defendant's counsel, the Court 
entered its Order as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on day of December, 2009 I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following 
David C. Biggs 
STEELE & BIGGS 
OF COUNSEL TO SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Kenneth Lougee 
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